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ABSTRACT 
As governments have liberalised their economic Policy regimes, competition for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has become more widespread. This kind of competition involves 
the granting of fiscal and financial incentives by both national and subnational 
governments the latter playing an increasingly important role in this game. While 
governments have a collective interest in refraining from such bidding wars, they get 
engaged because, otherwise, they fear that FDI will be diverted to other countries offering 
more incentives. Moreover, the resistance to abandon incentives is as strong or even 
stronger among developed countries than in developing countries. This is the main 
reason why incentives will persist even if an agreement is reached in future negotiations. 
The paper addresses these issues, focusing on recent developments at the multilateral 
and regional levels. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today developing as well as developed countries governments are competing, often 
fiercely, to attract increasing volumes of foreign dire.ct investment (FDI). This new attitude 
in developing countries is part of a broader change from relatively closed and state-led to 
more open and market-friendly policy regimes. Most of the former barriers and regulations 
have been dismantled and an intense competition for FDI is taking place. This competition, 
which often includes special concessions and/or substantial fiscal and financial incentives, 
occurs at national as well as sub-national levels. 
Among MERCOSUR countries, not only most regulations and barriers have been 
dismantled but specific policies, and even "bidding wars", to attract FDI have been adopted 
(especially in the automobile sector). This competition has raised four main criticisms: 
it "artificially'' distorts investment decisions and could thus have significant indirect effects 
on intra-regional trade; 
it drains fiscal resources which could eventually be used to tackle deficiencies in many 
areas (education, health, housing, etc.); 
it may negatively affect the fiscal balance of the states granting the incentives; 
it pays little attention to the increase of spillovers which could arise from investment decisions. 
This paper addresses the main issues regarding policy competition for FDI. The first section 
discusses the impact of FDI on social and economic development and the FDI-related policy 
alternatives. Section two describes the logic of the competition for FDI and the existing 
empirical evidence on its 
effects. Section three deals Today developing as well as developed countries' 
with the existing multilateral governments are competing, often fiercely, to 
disciplines on investments, 
paying special attention to attract increasing volumes of FDI. 
the issues of incentives and 
performance requirements on FDI. The main arguments for and against the establishment 
of a Multilateral Framework on Investments (MED are also examined. Section four deals with 
the regional dimension of FDI policy competition, analyzing the case of the European Union. 
This section also briefly deals with FDI-related policies and bidding wars within MERCOSUR. 
Section five presents the concluding remarks and some policy recommendations. 
I. THE IMPACT OF FDI ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT: THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
FDI is generally considered as a driving force for the integration of developing countries into 
the globalization process. Although most FDI is concentrated in developed countries, 
developing countries have made the biggest gains in the 1990s in terms of FDI inflows: 
from an annual average of US$ 22 billion in 1984-89 (19 per cent of global inflows) to US$ 
145 billion in 1995-1998 (32 per cent of global inflows). However, a small number of 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America (notably China and Brazil) has attracted 
most of the recent flows of FDI. 
According to LaII (1998), there are three main options of FDI-related policies available for 
developing countries: 
a "passive open doors" strategy; 
selective policies that use FDI as one way among others to access foreign created assets 
while intervening to promote the development of local competitive capabilities; 
pro-active policies to attract and guide FDI to activities that most benefit local development. 
Which are the main arguments for a "passive open doors" policy? At microeconomic level, 
FDI is seen as a potentially powerful instrument for improving access to international 
markets, for obtaining the technological and organizational capabilities required to produce 
and export goods and services, and, thus, for enhancing the international competitiveness 
of the host country. FDI is also seen as a source of spillovers through technology diffusion, 
workers training, linkages with domestic firms, etc. At macroeconomic level, FDI may 
significantly contribute to finance current account deficits in the host countries. Moreover, 
since Multinational Corporations (MNCs) investment strategies are guided by long term 
considerations and, once installed, have large sunk costs, FDI is less volatile than portfolio 
investment and other types of international financial flows. For both reasons, an increasing 
volume of FDI is often taken as a vital contribution to the development process. 
According to LaII (1998), this strategy will attract FDI seeking to exploit existing locational 
advantages, such as domestic markets, natural resources or low cost labor. Even if this kind 
of FDI will yield some externalities, host countries will not take full advantage of the benefits 
that MNCs can bring. In 
Competition, which often includes special con- 
fact, there are few, if any, 
countries which have cessions and/or substantial fiscal and financial 
followed a totally passive 
incentives, occurs at national as well as at sub- 
policy towards FDI. 
Argentina has completely national levels. 
liberalized its FDI regime; 
yet, it applies some sectoral or specific instruments to attract inflows under the automotive 
and mining regimes and the privatization program. 
Japan, Korea and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan, are among the countries that have adopted 
the more selective strategy (although Taiwan also has resorted to elements of the pro-active 
strategy). In turn, Singapore -a country with one of the highest ratios between inward FDI 
and domestic GDP- is the best example of the pro-active strategy. 
The selective strategy, by combining different modes of asset transfer (FDI, licensing, 
reverse engineering, etc.) with serious efforts to develop the skills and technological 
capabilities of local enterprises, can lead to larger benefits for the long-term development 
of host countries. However, "this strategy can only be conducted successfully in an export- 
oriented setting where interventions are counter-balanced by competitive pressures from 
world markets" (Lail, 1998, p. 440). 
The main rationale for these more activist approaches is that the potential benefits that FDI 
may entail should not be taken for granted and, perhaps more important, should be 
confronted with the costs derived from FDI presence. As Dunning (1993) states, 'many 
countries in the world are dependent on MNCs as providers of resources, capabilities and 
markets, as creators of jobs and wealth, as suppliers of foreign currency, as stimulators of 
entrepreneurship and worker motivation, and as raisers of demand expectancies (p. 284). 
But while MNCs are interested in a limited number of private economic goals, governments 
have a broader range of objectives (GDP growth, full employment, distribution of income 
and wealth, sovereignty in decision-making, political and cultural identity, environmental 
protection, etc.). In the same vein, whereas MNCs are interested in maximizing global 
profits or sales, governments are interested in maximizing the welfare of their own citizens. 
The pro-active strategy, if accompanied by measures designed to provide the skills, 
technological backup and infrastructure required by more complex activities, may lead to 
greater benefits for host countries. However, an excessive dependence on FDI may not lead 
to the development of domestic capabilities. 
In this scenario, some host countries may be worse-off as a result of MNCs' activity. 
National control over strategic economic sectors may be lost, indigenous enterprises may 
be displaced in certain activities and jobs may be lost, the local environment m4 suffer, 
etc. Even if the net benefits are positive, it is possible to assume that host countries are 
often not as well-off as they could be. This implies a difficult counterfactual analysis; in 
other words, the question to be answered in each case is what would have occurred in the 
absence of MNCs or in the absence of a set of policies aimed to increase the net benefits 
received by host countries from MNCs presence and to build strong national 
entrepreneurial and technological capabilities. 
The contribution of FDI to economic development depends not only on its volume but also 
on its quality. The type of investment involved, the sectors targeted, the kind of assets 
MNCs bring and the role affiliates play within the global network of the corporation are 
important determinants. At the same time, the characteristics of host countries affect not 
only the amount and kind of FDI that is attracted but also its contribution to growth, 
competitiveness and sustainable human development. These characteristics include the 
macroeconomic situation, trade, competition, sectoral and specific policies towards foreign 
and domestic enterprises, economic performance (GDP growth, price stability, etc.) and 
structural factors (market size, the availability of natural resources, the quantity and quality 
of human resources, the physical and technological infrastructure, business ethics, the 
legal system, etc). The characteristics of indigenous entrepreneurs (i.e. the sectors in which 
they operate, their corporate structures, strategies, innovative capabilities, organizational 
procedures, risk attitudes, etc.) are also major determinants (Dunning, 1994). 
Though FDI may play a positive role, leading to economic diversification and higher exports, 
generating employment and externalities and strengthening the local system of innovation, 
its role may also be detrimental. This is the case when FDI operates as an enclave that 
exploits natural resources with bad environmental practices, when foreign affiliates take 
advantage of their proprietary assets to crowd out local competitors or to engage in market 
distorting practices, etc. 
As for the impact of FDI on the balance of payments, it is obvious that not only the initial 
inflow must be considered. Remittances will have a negative effect on the balance of 
payments sooner or later. Profits are remitted abroad as dividends and, sometimes, as royalty 
and interest payments by means of transfer pricing of merchandise imports and exports. 
Moreover, MNCs may exhibit a greater import propensity than local firms, as documented in 
several studies (see Chudnovsky & Lopez, 1998). Thus, in the long term, many FDI projects 
may end up having a negative contribution to the balance of payments. At the same time, 
new developments in financial markets and the expansion of existing instruments -for 
example, hedging- have greatly blurred the distinction between FD1 and portfolio investment 
in terms of their relative stability. Moreover, profit remittances may be as volatile as portfolio 
investment flows, especially during an economic crisis (South Centre, 1997). 
1. 
Of course, this statement raises the key 
question of the possible redundancy of 
incentives, which might only be properly 
treated through a counterfactual analy- 
sis, which seldom can be performed. 
In sum, FDI can certainly be conducive to growth, competitiveness and sustainable human 
development in host developing countries. It may have however some, occasionally significant, 
costs which have to be considered as well. Therefore, a careful assessment of the impact of FDI 
is called for in order to design and implement policies at national and international levels that 
may enhance the benefits and reduce the costs of FDI for host countries. For these countries to 
reap such potential benefits a social or absorptive capability is needed. Empirical evidence 
shows, in turn, that this capability is often in shortage in most developing countries. Education 
and training of human resources, a sound science and technology domestic infrastructure, 
institution-building and the creation or development of markets such as capital markets, and the 
strengthening of domestic entrepreneurship are all crucial elements in this respect. 
II. POLICY COMPETITION FOR FDI: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
AND POLICY DEBATES 
A) THE DEBATE ON INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ON FDI: A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Before dealing with policy competition for FDI, it is important to discuss whether individual 
countries should or should not grant incentives to investment. In other words, the question 
is whether an economic rationale for investment incentives can be constructed. 
There is a broad consensus on the determinants of FDI inflows. The size, growth rate and 
perspectives of the host market stand as major determinants in almost any of the available 
surveys, especially when 
market-seeking investments When there are several potential locations, 
are considered. Natural which share some common "fundamental" attri- 
resource and/or labor force 
availability are relevant in butes, incentives may exert an influence on 
the case of resource investment decisions. 
seeking, export-oriented 
investments. However, MNCs seem to be increasingly involved into the so-called "strategic- 
asset" seeking investments. In this case, the relevant location& advantages are related to 
the physical, communication and technological infrastructure, the skills of the indigenous 
labor force, etc. Economic and political stability and a sound regulatory framework seem to 
be necessary but not sufficient pre-conditions to guarantee a steady flow of foreign 
investment when the above-mentioned locational advantages are lacking (see UNCTAD, 
1992, 1994a; Jun & Singh, 1996; Davidson, 1993). 
There is a similarly broad consensus that incentives do not rank high among the main 
determinants of FIDI inflows, as they are unable per se to attract investments to regions or 
countries which lack other locational advantages such as an attractive domestic market, natural 
resources, an skilled labor force, etc. Nonetheless, when several potential locations share some 
common "fundamental" attributes, incentives may influence investment decisions, especially in 
highly mobile and cost-oriented projects. Thus, incentives attract investments in specific sectors, 
regions or countries where it might otherwise not have occurredl (UNCTAD, 1994b). The 
impact of incentives varies according to the strategies and motivations of the investing firm, the 
market towards which the investment is oriented, the investor's condition of "already established" 
or "newcomer", the sector and country of origin of the investor, etc. (Aranda & Sauvant, 1996). 
Moreover, there are discrepancies among different surveys regarding: 
the actual influence of incentives; 
the possibility that incentives may be playing an increasing role on investment decisions; 
WO the more suitable type of incentives to attract "high-quality" FDI inflows -i.e., those that 
generate substantial spillovers, employ skilled workers and/or are directed towards "modern" or 
high value-added sectors-; and 
(iv) the effectiveness of incentives to reach the targets originally envisaged (Aranda & Sauvant, 
1996; Donahue, 1996; Hill, 1996; Jun & Singh, 1996; Mortimore & Peres, 1996; Oman, 1999; 
Tu & Schive, 1995; UNCTAD, 1992, 1994a). 
The main theoretical rationale for investment incentives is to correct the failure of markets to 
reflect spillovers. If an investment creates spillovers that cannot be fully captured by the 
investing firm, a gap between the private and the social return of the investment emerges. 
Incentives would thus help to close that gap. Incentives can also be granted to offset the effects 
of other policy interventions (i.e., the exemption of duties to compensate for the effects of 
protectionist tariffs). Moreover, for countries in which there is a dearth of FDI, incentives can 
be a way to attract "pioneer" investors. If this policy succeeds, a sort of "demonstration effect" 
could arise, inducing further and self-sustaining FDI flows. Finally, incentives are sometimes 
granted as a compensation for the introduction of performance requirements (PR) which 
MNCs must accept in order to invest in a certain host country. 
PRs such as local content, export commitments, R&D expenditures, job creation, etc. have 
been extensively, though not exclusively, used by developing countries governments2. In 
principle, they are designed to ensure that the operations of foreign firms are attune with the 
policy objectives of the host country and with its overall strategy of social and economic 
development. For instance, PRs may be an instrument to control anti-competitive business 
practices by MNCs. 
In some cases, a bargain can be struck in which an incentive that is highly valued by the 
investor and implies a low marginal cost to the host country (such as the access to the benefits 
of an existing free trade zone) is traded for a PR involving a low marginal cost to the investor 
but a high real or perceived value to the host country (e.g. a commitment for local expenditure 
on R&D). In this way, a balance between the host country's interests and the investor's could 
be achieved (UNCTAD, 1994b). Of course, this is an overly optimistic bargaining scenario, 
since it is also possible that the incentive involved has more than a 'marginal" cost (as it is often 
the case) and/or that the PR may be unacceptable to MNCs. 
Incentives as well as PR are mainly supported by those who consider that market forces do not 
lead to the socially desirable amount or composition of FDI, do not prevent FDI to have 
deleterious effects for host countries' development objectives and/or fail to align the private and 
social returns of investments. In turn, orthodoxy questions the efficacy of incentives and is 
generally hostile to PR. Incentives could be useful to promote regional development, to correct 
market failures, or to realize positive externalities but in most cases they are seen by the 
orthodoxy as a "second best" solution. Given that incentives are often used to compensate for 
other regulations, the "first best" solution would be to remove the "distortion' in question. In 
turn, if a government seeks to foster development in a certain region, the first best solution is 
to increase the spending on physical and human capital right there. The orthodox criticism is 
even more virulent regarding sectoral or firm targeted incentives policies, as these entail a 
"distortion" of the resource allocation that "free market forces" would produce. 
The WTO (1996) makes additional critiques to the use of incentives, based on: 
distributional considerations: investment incentives transfer part of the value of FDI-related 
spillovers from the host countries to MNCs. The more intense the competition among potential 
hosts the greater the proportion of spillovers which is transferred to the MNCs; 
knowledge considerations: advocacy of incentives heavily relies on the assumption that 
governments have a detailed knowledge of the value of the positive externalities associated with 
each FDI project, but in practice it is almost impossible to estimate these effects; 
political economy considerations: the benefits from a particular FDI project are likely to 
accrue to certain groups while the costs of incentives are likely to be spread across society. This 
opens the door for politically influential special interest groups to lobby the government to 
provide incentives which primarily benefit them, but which are largely paid for by other groups; 
local investors may feel discriminated vis-a-vis foreign investors. To circumvent such 
discrimination, local investors register themselves in many cases as companies in another 
country from where they invest in their own countries under the banner of foreign investment. 
The WTO has argued that only under very stringent conditions investment incentives 
can correct market failures; this could be the case when a country is trying to deal with 
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2. 
Sometimes investment incentives ope- 
rate as de facto performance fequire- 
ments. This is the case, for example, of 
a tax rebate depending on the size of 
local operations, or labor training grants 
depending on the size of the labor force 
at the local plant (UNCTAD, 1994b). 
structural problems in a certain region. Even if an adequate incentive could be 
granted, its costs would surely surpass potential benefits due to the lack of detailed 
knowledge, the burden of administrative and monitoring tasks, the new distortions 
introduced by the incentives and the scope of rent-seeking activities. Incentives are 
also seen as an important source of distortions in international trade and in the 
international allocation of investment resources. This explains why incentives were 
addressed in different agreements at the Uruguay Round of the GATT. In this regard, 
the orthodox view argues that developing countries are at a disadvantage when 
investment incentives are in place, as they skew investment and trade in favor of 
countries with "deep pockets" to afford such incentives (more on this below). 
In turn, PRs are seen as second best solutions, whose outcome is uncertain and which 
lead to rent-seeking behavior. In general, orthodox models tend to underline that PRs 
are welfare-reducing, except under very stringent circumstances. It has also been 
stated that the effectiveness of PRs has declined. As foreign affiliates of MNCs become 
more oriented towards global or regional markets and as the number of countries eager 
to attract FDI grows, the tolerance of MNCs for these kind of requirements is likely to 
be much smaller than in the past. In this scenario, PRs may be at best ineffective and 
at worst counter-productive, since FDI would prefer countries in which such 
requirements are not pushed (OECD, 1998b). 
Strong as these arguments look, they nonetheless have some flaws which mainly stem from 
the assumption of "perfect competition". When "imperfect competition" assumptions are 
introduced, the outcome of policy measures such as incentives or PR is indeterminate: "the 
prospect of capturing a share of the rents and externalities from the operations of 
international investors raises the stakes for those who are successful in attracting (or 
holding) them and imposes large opportunity costs on those who are not successful or do 
not take part in the competition" (Moran, 1998, p. 3). In this light, the fact that many 
developing countries do not have enough capabilities to design, implement, monitor and 
enforce FDI-related activist policies and that rent-seeking activities are a real threat calls for 
the strengthening of a system of checks and balances rather than a general ban on any 
kind of public intervention. 
In addition, the empirical evidence is not conclusive regarding the use of incentives and PRs. 
There are failed as well as successful experiences, which suggests that the outcome depends 
on a set of institutional, historical, international, political, social and economic conditions, as 
well as on chance. Besides, incentives and PRs may assume, in practice, different forms and 
may have different goals. For example, Moran (1998) rejects the case for import related PRs 
(such as local content requirements -which, according to the author, have neither empirical nor 
theoretical grounds-); the same applies to joint-venture and technology-transfer requirements. 
On the contrary, Moran supports export related PRs as they may induce investors to include 
developing and transition economy sites within their sourcing networks, benefiting not only firm 
and host-country welfare, but also global welfare. This is particularly important because several 
studies show that world-scale sized plants may generate substantial spiilovers and dynamic 
advantages to host countries. There is also evidence that, if export requirements are not in 
place, market failures may arise and that kind of investments may not take place. 
Once perfect competition assumptions are dismissed and the lessons of experience are taking 
into account, there are reasons that may justify the implementation of investment incentives 
progra ms: 
when there are regions that are underdeveloped/backward or that have high unemployment 
rates and which, by themselves, are not able to attract the investment flows that are needed to 
foster development; 
when governments are interested in promoting investments in some specific sectors, when 
they look for export-oriented investments or when they try to increase the spillovers of the 
investments (in terms of suppliers development, human resources training, technological 
absorption, etc.); and 
iii) when there might be a discrepancy between FDI and the host country's 
development objectives. 
The danger of "political" capture of the incentives programs does exist and the issue should 
deserve special attention. The difficulties to monitor and enforce incentives are also well 
known, especially in Latin American countries. Governments seldom perform detailed 
studies on the costs and benefits of incentive packages (see UNCTAD, 1999b, for a 
discussion about the almost insurmountable difficulties inherent to any attempt to precisely 
estimate the costs and benefits of an incentive program)3 . Furthermore, spillovers do not 
seem to be the main immediate reason why incentives are offered. There are generally 
politically-oriented reasons, as governments tend to search for investments because they 
are supposed to bring new jobs to their countries/regions -jobs that would go to other 
countries/regions if incentives were absent-. In this scenario, the danger of bidding wars in 
which the costs of incentives exceed the social benefits for host countries must be seriously 
evaluated (see below). 
The global scenario as well as the pattern of trade and investment flows must also be considered. 
Investments are now more geographically mobile, so that regulation could be more difficdt than 
in the past. In turn, the technological gap between native firms and MNCs, especially when it 
comes to high-tech activities, seems to have expanded. This could mean that -except for the few 
countries which have "unique" locational advantages (i.e., the domestic Chinese marke0- 
stringent PRs could have an innocuous or even a counter-productive effect (diverting 
investments to countries where such requirements are not present or are weaker). In turn, 
forbidding entry into a particular sector could increase the technological gap even further. 
Last but not least, if "fundamentals" are lacking (market size, growth perspectives, domestic 
infrastructure, skilled human resources, etc.) incentives will not attract significant "high- 
quality" flows of FDI and PRs won't yield their expected results. For example, Cantwell & 
Mudambi (1998) have analyzed the effects of incentives on R&D activity. The authors find 
that while government support affects R&D investments at the margin, other variables are 
primary determinants of the location of R&D activities (domestic infrastructure, skilled 
human resources, local linkages with other innovative firms and research institutions, etc.): 
"locations in which indigenous firms have an innovative tradition will best attract firms from 
the leading foreign centers in the industry in question, with a view to the extension of their 
R&D-intensive networks" (p. 19). 
B) POLICY COMPETITION FOR FDI: ISSUES AND TRENDS 
Notwithstanding the debate, most governments seem to be persuaded that incentives "work". 
Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that a greater number of governments are involved 
in investments competition than in the 1980s and that the overall 'cost-per-job' of the typical 
incentives package has risen (see Aranda & Sauvant, 1996; OECD, 1998a; Oman, 1999)4. 
Competition has become more widespread as governments have liberalized their policy 
regimes. This competition is mostly intra-regional, since governments seek to compete with 
neighboring countries for investments that are already, in principle, destined for their region. 
It occurs not only among national governments but also among sub-national governments, 
which seem to play an increasingly important role in this game. 
Investors often define a "short-list" of locations and negotiate conditions and possible 
incentives with each of the competing governments. Investors may openly foster competition 
among authorities, or even "ask for their best offers" before making the final site selection 
(Oman, 1999), feeding the so-called "bidding wars" for investments. 
Investment incentives include: 
financial incentives (involving the transfer of funds directly to foreign investors by the 
host government -investment grants, subsidized credits, loan guarantees, etc.-); 
fiscal incentives (designed to reduce the overall tax burden for a foreign investor -tax 
holidays, tax rebates, accelerated depreciation allowances, exemptions from import 
duties or duty drawbacks; specific deductions from gross earnings for income-tax 
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For example, regarding spillovers, their 
measurement is not only difficult but it 
is also important to assess if those 
spillovers are or not fully internalized by 
MNCs; it is evident that if full interna- 
lization occurs, there would be no room 
for incentives on this basis (Aranda & 
Sauvant, 1996). 
To illustrate the extension of this phe- 
nomenon it is worth reminding that a 
survey made in the early 1990s showed 
that among 103 countries covered only 
four did not have any type of fiscal 
incentives, only 24 out of 83 did not 
have financial incentives and only 8 out 
of 67 did not have any type of 'indirect' 
incentives (UNCTAD, 1995). In- turn, a 
survey made by Deloitte and Touche on 
some 40 countries showed that ne,arly 
85 per cent of the countries surveyed 
had fiscal incentives to attract invest- 
ments (UNCTAD, 1999b). 
5. 
A significant part of policy competition 
for investments is relaed to the so- 
called 'tax havens". Though the treat- 
ment of the problem of tax havens 
exceeds the objectives of this paper, it 
is worth reminding some of the main 
issues involved in this phenomenon: i) 
tax havens are part of the so--called 
'harmful tax competition', which has 
been defined as the use of tax policies 
and practices that are judged by the 
international tax community to be over- 
ly aggressive in distorting the global 
allocation of capital investment and the 
associated tax base arid in creating 
new opportunities for international tax 
evasion (OECD, 1998a); ii) there has 
been an 'explosion' since 1985 in the 
use of zero- or low-tax jurisdictions as 
locations for FDI recorded by compa- 
nies resident in the G-7 countries; iii) 
globalization has tended to blur the dis- 
tinction between the national and the 
international effects of taxation. The 
potential impact of one country's tax 
policies on other economies has thus 
greatly increased in recent years. 
Furthermore, globalization is having 
some major negative effects on taxation 
and tax systems, since it opens new 
ways by which companies and indivi- 
duals can avoid taxes, and countries 
can develop tax policies aimed at 
diverting geographically mobile capital; 
iv) investors in tax havens who reside in 
non-haven countries may significantly 
reduce their domestic tax liability and 
become 'free riders' who benefit from 
public spending in their home country 
without contributing to its financing. In 
turn, governments and residents of tax 
havens can be 'free riders' that benefit 
from the positive internaional spillover 
effects of public goods and services 
that are supplied and paid for by non- 
haven countries; v) two main types of 
tax-induced distortions can be distin- 
guished: a) those related to companies' 
decisions on where to locate real 
investment; (b) those that arise from 
Prms' paper 'transactions' designed to 
'strip' income and profits generated in 
a high-tax jurisdiction in order to trans- 
fer them, on paper, to a low-tax juris- 
purposes, deductions from social security contributions, etc.-); 
iii) indirect incentives (designed to enhance the profitability of a FDI project in various 
indirect ways -subsidized land and dedicated infrastructure, preferential access to 
government contracts, special regulatory treatment, granting of monopolistic positions, etc.- 
(Aranda & Sauvant, 1996; WTO, 1996)6. 
A large and growing number of countries targets incentives to attract investment into 
specific types of activities or areas. These targets include: 
specific sectors (high-tech and high-value-added manufacturing, infrastructure, etc.); 
specific regions (generally those that are poorer or where unemployment is high); 
export-oriented investments; 
the attraction of regional headquarters of MNCs; 
specific MNCs activities that generate spillovers or contribute to solve certain social 
problems -R&D, labor training, job creation, etc. 
Even if governments tend in principle not to differentiate between domestic and foreign 
investment in the design or implementation of incentives, there are important exceptions to 
this rule. Moreover, foreign investors tend to make an extensive use of incentives, since they 
are often designed to attract "mobile" investment projects6. 
Consequently, any debate on FDI-related policies must take into account that incentives 
exist, that most governments apply them, and that they are here to stay, at least in the 
foreseeable future. Moreover, contrary to what one might presume, the resistance to 
abandon incentives is as strong or even stronger among developed countries than in 
developing countries. 
Oman (1999) suggests two possible outcomes regarding policy competition for FDI. The 
first one is based on a 'positive-sum game hypothesis", according to which competition 
produces net benefits for investors and host economies alike. The reasoning is that 
governments know the high priority investors attach to the "fundamentals" vis-a-vis fiscal 
and financial incentives per 
se. Governments thus seek 
to improve domestic 
supplies of human capital 
and infrastructure as well as 
to ensure political and 
macroeconomic stability. A corollary of this hypothesis is that intensified competition to 
attract FDI leads governments to "do a better job on the fundamentals". Hence, in addition 
to induce governments to take actions that enhance growth and productivity levels (even in 
the absence of additional FDI), those actions are likely to increase the global supply of FDI. 
In turn, since FDI can produce significant spillovers in the host economy, the increased 
level of global FDI should come closer to socially desirable levels. 
The opposite scenario corresponds to the "negative-sum-game hypothesis". In this 
scenario, the benefits that could materialize tend to be offset by a sort of "prisoner's 
dilemma". That is, as competition heats up, governments engage in costly "bidding wars" 
that push up the level of public subsidies offered to investors up to a point that could be 
unjustifiable from society's perspective. While governments have a collective interest in 
refraining from such bidding wars, they get involved anyway because of their fear that, if 
they refrain from doing so, FDI will be diverted to other countries offering more incentives. 
There are many other potential negative consequences of "bidding wars": 
public funds addressed to incentives could be used more productively to finance public 
goods such as human capital formation and infrastructure; 
incentive programs place already-established investors at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-a-vis the "newcomers" receiving the incentives. This may even induce "round-tripping" 
(i.e., investing abroad in order to return as a °new" foreign investment); 
if governments make an extensive use of incentives (which may also lack transparency), 
Investors may openly foster competition among 
authorities, or even "ask for their best offers" 
before making the final site selection. 
potential investors will perceive this situation as unsustainable, reducing rather than 
enhancing their propensity to invest in the economy; 
iv) competition may create downward pressures on environmental and labor standards. 
In sum, investors would be the immediate beneficiaries of bidding wars, at the expense of 
governments and host economies. 
A useful distinction can be made between "incentives-based" and "rules-based" competition. 
The former refers mainly to the fiscal, financial and indirect incentives already mentioned. These 
incentives may be granted automatically (subject to qualifying conditions) or discretionally. 
Discretion may be seen as a necessary condition for a successful negotiation with investors that 
ensures an efficient targeting of incentives; yet, it also reduces transparency and increases the 
scope for bribery and corruption. In turn, incentives may be linked to PR -regarding local 
content, export levels, employment creation, etc.-; in these cases, incentives may be seen as a 
compensation for the disincentive effect of the PRs. In addition to those covered by Oman's 
survey, there are other instruments which governments may employ to attract or retain 
investments. In many cases, even if these instruments are not originally designed to influence 
investment flows, they may have significant effects on investors' decisions. This is notably the 
case of the so-called investment-related trade measures i.e., a mix of rules and incentives-, 
which include tariffs, quotas, export programs, export processing zones (EPZs), anti-dumping 
measures, regional agreements, rules of origin, national standards, etc. (see UNCTAD, 1999a). 
As a way of incentives-based competition, the number and influence of investment- 
promotion agencies (IPAs) has expanded. IPAs are created to attract investments through 
different mechanisms, often including attractive incentives "packages". Many IPAs are 
increasingly adopting targeted policies on a sectoral- and even on a firm-specific basis. 
According to Moran (1998), this kind of "marketing" effort does yield impressive results, as 
the evidence shows a high payoff for countries which make aggressive efforts to attract FDI, 
i.e., benefits with a net present value of almost four dollars for every dollar expended. 
Moreover, some of these agencies have succeeded in attracting high-quality investments 
without excessive special concessions for MNCs (this seems to be the case of the Intel 
investment in Costa Rica, according to Spar, 1998). 
The Welsh Development Agency (WDA) is one of the most famous IPAs, and its experience 
has been vastly examined, since many of its initiatives are regarded internationally as models 
of best practice. The WDA intervenes not only in negotiations leading to initial investments 
by foreign firms (trying to fulfill the requirement of inward investors), but it has also taken 
several initiatives to offer after-care services7. Interestingly enough, WDA policy has shifted 
towards a more sectoral focused approach and has prioritized the attraction of investments 
in sectors such as electronics or automotive vehicles. Among its initiatives can be mentioned 
a program for supplying chain development, an initiative geared to offer specialized training 
for investors in certain sectors, and programs concerned with assisting the globalization of 
indigenous firms through partnerships with similar foreign firms (Phelps et al, 2000). 
In turn, "rules-based" competition may range from changes in environmental and labor standards 
(or in the enforcement levels of those standards) to the signing of regional-integration treaties, the 
tightening of the protection of intellectual property rights, the strengthening of judicial systems, the 
establishment of EPZs, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, market deregulation, and the 
liberalization of trade and investment policies. The enhancement of economic and political 
stability may also be considered as part of a "rules-based" competition for FDI. 
C) THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON POLICY COMPETITION FOR FDI 
On the basis of a multi-country study undertaken by the OECD Development Centre (Oman, 
1999) a brief review of the most recent and authoritative report on this issue is presented 
below. The evidence seems to be inconsistent with the more extreme versions of both the 
"positive-sum game" and the "negative-sum game" hypotheses. Regarding the former, it 
has not been found that policy competition for FDI has been a primary determinant of 
certain government actions, which would have not otherwise been pursued, such as 
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diction for tax purposes; vi) 'companies 
may actively seek out tax breaks and 
encourage countries to match prefe- 
rences available in other countries. In 
these cases governments may find 
themselves in a 'prisoner's dilemma' 
where they collectively would be better 
off by not offering incentives but each 
feels compelled to offer the incentive to 
maintain a competitive business envi- 
ronment... In this context, and in the 
absence of international co-operation, 
there is little incentive for a country 
which provides a harmful preferential 
lao regime to eliminate it since this 
could merely lead the activity to move 
to another country which continues to 
offer a preferential treatment (OECD, 
1998a). See OECD (2000) for a report 
on harmful tax regimes and tax havens 
which includes policy proposals for 
tackling this issue at global level. In this 
report, the OECD has identified, 
besides tax havens, more than 60 
potentially harmful preferential lux 
regimes within the OECD area. 
In fact, financial liberalization has 
increased the mobility of capital, 
making it easier for potential investors 
tu make host governments to compete 
against each other in their bids lo 
attract an investment project. 
The WDA visits every inward investing 
company at least once a year to keep 
abreast of development and to help 
with further expansion. 
8. 
Nonetheless, 'indirect incentives in 
the form of subsidized infrastructure or 
labor training may also generate 
spillovers. 
investing in education and modern infrastructure. Policy competition does not seem to have 
contributed to increase the global supply of FDI (actually, causality seems to have run in 
the opposite way). Nonetheless, some evidence exists that competition for FDI has helped 
to foster "better government" in many developing countries. It also has, in some cases, 
made a contribution to enhance the local supply of infrastructure and education. At the 
same time, the findings of the survey support the hypothesis that an improved endowment 
of human resources and modern infrastructure tends to act as a powerful attraction for FDI. 
However, the evidence does not lend strong support to the view that competition for FDI is 
unleashing uncontrolled bidding wars that push investment incentives above socially justifiable 
levels, although this statement must be qualified given the difficulty to assess properly the costs 
of incentives and the benefits of investments. This is particularly so taking into account that, in 
practice, governments are generally reluctant to give information on these issues. In addition, 
there have not been found "races to the bottom" in environmental or labor standards (though 
the danger of such "races" does exist). In fact, the evidence shows that competition for FDI may 
exert some upward pressure on those standards, especially in the case of investments in 
relatively °clean' and knowledge or skill-intensive manufacturing and service industries. 
Nonetheless, bidding wars do obviously exist and it is fairly probable that policy 
competition has allowed investors to increase their share of the benefits accruing from 
their investments. Some incentive regimes designed to stimulate the social and economic 
development of poorer or 
disadvantaged regions 
have fallen short of this 
objective and may have, in 
fact, exacerbated rather than reduced regional income inequalities. For example, in 
OECD countries regional-development policies may have been co-opted for the pursuit of 
policy competition that does not mainly benefit the poorest segments of the population 
or those most suffering from unemployment (Oman, 1999). In contrast, in developing 
and emerging economies some evidence of policy competition benefiting poorer areas 
may be found, as in the Northeast of Brazil. There is also evidence of the tendency for 
policy competition to favor large firms at the expense of smaller firms. At the same time, 
the lack of transparency of many incentive deals has created possibilities for corruption 
and rent seeking. Mytelka (2000) adds one further objection to "bidding wars", namely, 
that they seldom attract the kind of FDI which fosters innovation and learning. 
In this connection, "rules-based" competition may have some advantages (Oman, 1999): 
except when environmental or labor standards are lowered, benefits may extend not only 
to investors but to the whole society (i.e., when governments improve the judicial system, 
sign regional agreements or when legal, political and economic stability and predictability 
are achieved, etc.)8; 
many of the "rules-based" competition policies involve creating more stable, predictable 
and transparent rules for investors and governments alike. 
it gives less room for bribery and corruption; 
The lack of transparency of many incentive deals has 
created possibilities for corruption and rent seeking. 
Competition for FDI is intense and st II growing; however, new peaks are not expected for 
three reasons: 
the upsurge in global FDI flows has been a stimulus, rather than an effect, of competition for 
FDI. Even when global FDI flows may continue to rise in the longer run, there is little reason to 
expect a further surge in its level vis-a-vis those of world trade and output; 
while a turn away from inward-oriented and often FDI hostile development strategies has 
taken place over the last 15 years, most countries have already made that shift; 
incentives-based competition tends to be highly concentrated in the auto industry. It is 
unlikely that in the near future investment levels in this industry will match those experienced in 
the last two decades, since there is a significant worldwide productive overcapacity in this sector. 
Caution is required, nonetheless, on three fronts. The first one is transparency. Concretely, 
the question is how to ensure the accountability of government officials involved in the 
negotiation of incentives. The issue of transparency also points to the need for governments 
to be able to monitor their own use of incentives. The second front is what Oman defines 
as 'bounded competition", which means that policy competition is disciplined by a 
regulatory framework which set rules for the granting of aid and establish procedures and 
sanctions in order to guarantee their enforcement. According to Oman, bounded 
competition should be the objective of any regional or multilateral arrangement on FDI, 
since an outright suppression of competition is not feasible. Finally, developing countries, 
whose financial resources are often scarce, should move from incentives-based towards 
rules-based means of attracting FDI (while maintaining or strengthening their defense of 
workers rights and the environment). Nonetheless, some case studies surveyed by Oman 
show successful experiences with the use of incentives to attract FDI (for example, 
Singapore, where incentives were often sectorally and functionally targeted), though it must 
be noted also that this country had also gotten the "fundamentals' right -political and 
economic stability, adequate infrastructure, a well qualified labor force, etc.-. 
III. POLICY COMPETITION FOR FDI: THE MULTILATERAL 
DIMENSION 
There are no multilateral rules on investment as there are for trade issues. Investment 
incentives are one of the areas with less coverage within the 'patchwork" of international 
rules regarding investment issues and only some PR have begun to be tackled in the 
context of the GATT. 
In this scenario, efforts to define regional or multilateral rules on investments have been 
made for many years. One of the most relevant international agreements in this field is the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), signed in 1994, which has 49 members plus the European 
Union. The ECT has been considered as the "most ambitious attempt to date to set up an 
international regime for both investment and trade" (Andrews-Speed & Walde, 1996). 
Despite its broad scope, the ECT has no provisions on.investment incentives. 
The main international rules on investments are the so-called bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), which are mostly limited to the protection of investments once they are made. The 
number of BITs reached 1513 by the end of 1997. Of these, 249 were between developing 
countries. Just in 1997, 27 per cent of the 153 treaties concluded that year were between 
developing countries. Apart from BITs, there are numerous bilateral treaties aimed at avoiding 
double taxation (UNCTAD, 1998). By the end of 1996, almost all Latin American countries had 
signed at least one BIT (SELA, 1997). Some of these BITs follow the "U.S." matrix guaranteeing 
the application of the national treatment (NT) and most favored nation (MFN) clauses not only 
at the post-establishment but also at the pre-establishment stage. Others are similar to the 
"European" model -which adopts the more traditional criterion of granting NT and MFN rights 
only at the post-establishment stage-. The U.S. matrix usually contains other provisions not 
covered by the European model -such as PR, entry of key personnel, etc.-. Such matrix 
contains, thus, what has been termed "high-level" disciplines regarding investment issues. 
However, the proliferation of BITs does not lead, per se, to a Multilateral Framework on 
Investments (MFI), since coverage and discipline levels are very heterogeneous; even 
inconsistent rules may be established in different agreements. Current members of the 
WTO would have to sign 7503 agreements should they wish to provide investment 
protection for their nationals through bilateral treaties according to the WTO (1996). 
, The GATT/WTO and the OECD have been the main fora where the issue of multilateral 
disciplines on investment incentives has been addressed. During the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT investment issues were addressed in different agreements. Besides, two working 
groups were established in 1996 -one on trade and investment issues and the other one on 
trade and competition policy-, and the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
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They demand that an investor supplies 
certain markets with a designated 
product or products manufactured 
from a specified facility or operation, or 
commits itself to assign to the affiliated 
company concerned the exclusive right 
to export specified products worldwide 
or to certain regional markets. 
calls for further discussion on incentives in the near future. In turn, the OECD has taken 
some steps towards the establishment of multilateral rules since 1976, when a Declaration 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises was issued. This Declaration calls 
for NT, and includes an Instrument on Investment Incentives and Disincentives aimed at 
greater transparency in subsidy practices. The OECD has also defined a Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
However, these instruments have not introduced "high-level" disciplines as some of them are 
non-binding and most lack effective dispute settlement procedures. This led to the initiative 
to launch the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) in 1995. As seen below, MAI 
negotiations ended by April 1998 without having reached the expected agreement. 
A) THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 
Five of the agreements signed during the Uruguay Round of the GATT contain provisions 
on investments: the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCMs) and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes. More recently, the basic telecommunications agreement and the 
financial services agreement signed in 1997 extended multilateral rules on investment to 
two sectors of considerable economic significance. 
Since investment was seen as one of the means of delivering services, the GATS covers 
a wide range of investment issues in the services sectors. With the exception of the 
prohibition of measures "which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint 
venture through which a service supplier may supply a service" (article XVI, 2.e), the 
GATS does not include any provisions regarding incentives or PR. As for the TRIPs 
agreement, even if it does not contain provisions regarding investment incentives or PR, 
it was supposed to create an environment conducive to investment by enhancing the 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
The TRIMs agreement deals primarily with PR, which could lead to distortive effects on 
trade. It does not deal with investment per se but only with those PR directly related to 
trade. The list of prohibited measures include: 
local content requirements; 
trade-balancing requirements; 
foreign exchange-balancing requirements; 
those which restrict the export of products, whether specified in terms of the particular 
type, volume or value of products or of a proportion of volume or value of local production. 
Prohibited practices include those that are mandatory in nature and those with which 
compliance is necessary in order to obtain an advantage. A five year transition period was 
established in order to eliminate prohibited TRIMs in developing countries, which can be 
extended if developing countries find difficulties. 
Despite the efforts of the U.S. and other developed countries, a group of other TRIMs did 
not fall under the prohibition of the agreement (Graham, 1997). Non-prohibited TRIMs 
include, for example, export requirements, product mandating requirements9, foreign 
exchange restrictions, technology transfer requirements, licensing requirements, 
remittance restrictions and local equity requirements (Low & Subramanian, 1995). 
Finally, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCMs) makes some 
financial and fiscal incentives inconsistent with WTO rules (Sanin, 1997; Sauve, 1994). A 
subsidy is defined as a financial contribution -grants, loans, equity infusions, loan 
guarantees, fiscal incentives, the provision of goods or services, the purchase of goods, 
etc.- by a government or any public body within the territory of a WTO member, which 
confers a benefit to its recipient. The ASCMs applies not only to measures of national 
governments, but also to measures applied by sub-national governments and of such 
public bodies as state-owned companies (Tussie & Lengyel, 1998). 
Some types of investment incentives may fall under the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures disciplines. Fiscal incentives would generally be considered as 
subsidies, since they fall within the definition of "government revenue ... otherwise due [that] 
is foregone or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits)". Financial incentives 
would meet the ASCMs definition of "a government practice Rhatl involves a direct transfer of 
funds (e.g., grants, loans and equity infusion)". Furthermore, at least some kinds of indirect 
incentives would appear to be subsidies; for example, the provision of land and infrastructure 
at less than market prices would appear to fall within the definition of "a government 
provid[ing] goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchas[ing] goods° (WTO, 
1996). Nonetheless, the thrust of the ASCMs is toward trade in goods and, as such, may not 
be easily applied to investment incentives because the flows of goods by definition occur only 
after the investment has been made. Thus, by the time production and exportation of a 
subsidized project have started, investment incentives will have ended. In this case, neither a 
recommendation to withdraw or modify a subsidy nor a countervailing duty applied to the 
exported goods will be able to "undo" or to change an investment that already has been made. 
Although the ACSM requires WTO members to notify their subsidy programmes, in practice 
there have been delays and some countries have failed with the obligation to notify or have 
claimed to have no subsidy programmes. A bigger problem is that outside the EU, many 
countries (including the United States and Canada) have provided little or no subisidy 
information for sub-national governments. Moreover, it has been observed that it is no clear how 
rules are going to work in practice with sub-national incentives, since different uncertainties arise 
regarding, for instance, who should be the complaining party in many cases (Thomas, 1998)10. 
In addition to the above provisions, the Ministerial Conference held a decision in 
Singapore in December 1996 to establish a working group to examine the relationship 
between trade and investment and another which should study the interaction 
between trade and competition policy and anti-competitive practices (the latter being 
of special interest for developing countries, which had tried to include this issue at the 
Uruguay Round agenda). This was so notwithstanding the resistance of many 
developing countries, which were split between those ready to include investment 
issues at the WTO agenda, and those (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tanzania, 
etc.) arguing that incentives could only be addressed in the context of the built-in 
agenda of TRI Ms (De la Guardia, 1997). Both groups have delivered extensive reports 
on their activities and on the discussion held on the issues under study. 
Among the issues discussed by the trade and investment working group were: 
the implications of the relationship between trade and investment for development 
and economic growth (economic parameters relating to macroeconomic stability - 
such as domestic savings, fiscal position and the balance of payments-; 
industrialization, privatization, employment, income and wealth distribution, 
competitiveness, transfer of technology and managerial skills; domestic conditions of 
competition and market structures); 
the economic relationship between trade and investment (the degree of correlation 
between trade and investment flows; the determinants of the relationship between 
trade and investment; the impact of business strategies, practices and decision- 
making on trade and investment; the relationship between the mobility of capital and 
the mobility of labor; the impact of trade policies and measures on investment flows; 
the impact of investment policies and measures on trade; country experiences 
regarding national investment policies, including investment incentives and 
disincentives; the relationship between foreign investment and competition policy); 
stocktaking and analysis of existing international instruments and activities 
regarding trade and investment (existing WTO provisions; bilateral, regional, 
plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives; implications for trade and 
investment flows of existing international instruments). 
Both Working Groups are conducting an "educational" work and their decisions do not 
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Thomas (1998) analyzes the case of the 
subsidies for Mercedes Benz invest- 
ment in Alabama in 1993. In this par- 
ticular case, the United States would 
not complain about its own subsidy, and 
the individual US states do not have 
standing to do so. The EU wouid pre- 
sumably not complain since an EU firm 
is the beneficiary. Finally, Japan might 
not complain because many Japanese 
firms have benefited from similar subsi- 
dies in the United States. 
This clarification was prncipally due to 
the insistence of the U.S. delegation. 
This reflects the fact that the U.S. prefers 
to negotiate within the OECD, since its 
main objective is to negotiate 'high-level' 
disciplines (De la Guardia, 1997). 
See OECD (1997, 1998c). he OECD 
Internet website also contairs valuable 
documentation regardirg NIAI, inclu- 
ding the negotiating text .and comments 
to the text. 
See Guerra de Araujo (1998) for an 
analysis of the implications of the MAI 
for Brazil 
Some of these PR -such as the require- 
ments on local content, trade and fo- 
reign exchange balancing and ratio of 
local sales to exports- are already 
banned in the TR1Ms. 
prejudice any future decision", but it is probable that the issue of investment may eventually 
be included in the WTO agenda. In fact, the built-in agenda of TRIMs, the GATS and the 
ASCMs will surely call for this inclusion. In this sense, the advantages of the WTO over other 
fora such as the OECD, lie in its global coverage and its dispute settlement system. 
Nonetheless, some developing countries fear that the dispute-settlement mechanisms of WTO 
will tilt the balance in favor of MNCs. Further, before discussing the pros and cons of an MFI 
from the point of view of developing countries, a brief analysis of the failed MAI is required. 
B) THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENTS (MAI) 
The OECD Ministers decided to launch negotiations on a MAI in May 199512. The basic 
argument for doing that was that regional agreements were necessarily partial in their 
geographic coverage and that existing OECD instruments were not binding or 
comprehensive and lacked 
effective dispute settlement 
procedures. It is important 
to note that the original 
objective of the MAI was to 
set "high standards" for the 
treatment and protection of 
investments. It was a comprehensive agreement, covering all economic sectors, and with a 
broad definition of "investment", including FDI, portfolio investments, real estate 
investments and rights under contract. Differently from most of the existing BITs, the MAI 
was to provide guarantees at the pre-establishment stage. The MAI aimed also to cover 
measures taken at all levels of government (central, state, provincial, local). The MAI 
adopted the principles of NT (the MAI Parties would commit themselves to treat foreign 
investors and their investments no less favorably than they treat their own investors) and of 
MFN (the MAI Parties would agree not to discriminate among the investors or investments 
of different MAI Parties). Other important provisions to be included in the MAI dealt with 
issues such as transparency, free transfer of investment-related payments, entry and stay 
of key personnel, expropriations and dispute resolutions. 
The extent of the exemptions and reservations 
proposed was so huge that it made many of its 
supporters doubt there would be an improvement 
over the existing national investment remes. 
The MAI applied a "top-down" approach under which the only exceptions permitted were 
to be those listed when adhering to the agreement (negative lists), and which would be 
subject to progressive liberalization. It also included "general exceptions" (under which any 
country would be able to take measures necessary to protect its national security or to 
ensure the integrity and stability of its financial system) and 'temporary safeguards" (under 
which any country would be able to take measures necessary to respond to a balance of 
payments crisis). By virtue of country-specific exceptions or reservations each country 
would be able to maintain laws and regulations not conforming to MAI disciplines. 
Even if negotiated among OECD countries, it was conceived as an open agreement, and it 
was expected that many developing countries would join. In fact, five non-OECD countries 
-Argentina, Brazi113, Chile, Hong Kong, and the Slovak Republic- joined the negotiations as 
"observers", and expressed their intention to join eventually. 
Regarding PR, the aim was to go further than existing rules by extending them first to the field 
of services, and, second, to requirements that distort investment flows even if the investment 




trade or foreign exchange balancing; 
ratio of local sales to exports; 
technology transfer (except when used to remedy violations of domestic competition laws); 
headquarters location; 
exclusive supply to certain markets; 
R&D investments; 
employment of local personnel; 
establishment of joint venture with domestic participation; 
achievement of a minimum level of domestic equity participation. 
All requirements were, however, not likely to be prohibited in all circumstances. The first 
five categories seem to be more distortive and were to be prohibited in all circumstances. 
In turn, some other PR would be allowed subject to the condition that the requirements 
were imposed on foreign and domestic investors as well, in connection with: 
the location of production; 
the provision of particular services; 
the training or employment of workers; 
the construction of particular facilities; and 
the conduct of R&D. 
An exception was also proposed for measures that were necessary to secure compliance 
with national laws and regulations, protect human, animal or plant life or health, or for the 
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. In addition, the MAI was 
likely to contain an exception for some trade PR in the context of export promOtion and 
preferential tariffs or quota programs. Similar exceptions were proposed for foreign aid 
programs, government procurement and privatization. Finally, over and above these 
exceptions, it would be possible to establish national reservations for specific measures 
(Ahnlid, 1997; Brooks, 1997). 
Notwithstanding these provisions which sharply constrained the scope of the MAI, many 
countries were reluctant to adopt new disciplines in this area. Moreover, many OECD 
countries made reservations about one or more of the bans on PR. 
Regarding investment incentives, as many observers have pointed out they did not feature 
prominently. Even if the MAI had been signed, it would not have contained more than an 
exhortation for transparency, NT and MFN clauses, consultation procedures and a "built- 
in" agenda. According to a negotiator -Ahnlid (1997)-, a number of influential OECD 
countries argued that MAI should not seek to discipline investment incentives, while others 
were proposing the creation of new rules. 
Since a requirement to extend incentives to all eligible foreign investors might increase the 
cost of incentive programs in certain circumstances, some members of the former group of 
countries argued that the application of non-discrimination principles would probably lead to 
a certain degree of indirect discipline on investment incentives. However, other countries were 
in total opposition to the introduction of new rules in this field, arguing that investment 
incentives were a legitimate and useful policy tool for promotion of economic development. It 
is worth noting, also, that some countries arguing along these lines sought country specific 
reservations from the rules on non-discrimination for incentives; in turn, many countries were 
reluctant to adopt explicitly the criteria of MFN and NT on the issue of investment incentives. 
Even countries which were of the view that disciplines on investment incentives were 
required acknowledged that incentives could be relevant in certain circumstances, such as 
in the promotion of regional, social, environmental and R&D objectives. The fact that 
incentives are often granted sub-nationally also seems to have contributed to the reluctance 
of some participants to agree on disciplines in this area. In addition a number of countries 
argued that tax incentives, as most other tax measures, should be excluded from MAI. 
Some countries were also concerned with the fact that any additional disciplines on 
investment incentives in the MAI could divert foreign investment to non-members and 
place MAI members at a disadvantage relative to non-members in their ability to retain or 
attract investment. In fact, though a number of possible options for disciplines were 
proposed -including a ban on so called positive discrimination (i.e. better treatment for 
foreign Investors than for domestic Investors) and an agreement on caps on the magnitude 
of certain investment incentives-, they were not seriously discussed (Ahnlid, 1997)15. 
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In a communication intended to initiate 
the debate on which should be the EU 
position regarding multilateral negotia- 
tions on investment issues, the EC 
clearly reveals the low priority attached 
to incentives disciplines in the 
European countries agertda. While two 
pages are devoted to justify the need of 
global disciplines regarding free access 
for foreign investors and NT and MFN 
rights, there is only one sentence rela- 
ted to incentives: 'exaggerated invest- 
ment incentives can distort the flow of 
investments or lead to an unintended 
'race to the bottom between countries 
or regions' (EC, 1995, p 9). 
It is reported that at one meeting held at 
the headquarters of UNCTAD in 1995, 
leaders of certain major developing 
countries indicated that they would not 
participate in a MAI even if they found 
Vie substance of the agreement to their 
!king because it was mat acceptable 
that the OECD countries force an inter- 
national agreement upon the develo- 
ping nations (Graham, 1997). 
In turn, the governments of many developed countries proposed several exceptions from 
the general rules of the MAI. For example, France and Canada wanted to restrict FDI in 
cultural industries, the EU wanted to preserve the rights of its investment promotion 
agencies to discriminate against foreign investors, the U.S. wanted that their states 
continued to be able to limit foreigner's purchases of farm land, and to preserve their 
regulations that ban foreign engagement in nuclear power plant operations and that require 
domestic ownership of television broadcasting stations, etc. The extent of the exemptions 
and reservations proposed was so huge that it made many of its supporters doubt there 
would be an improvement over the existing national investment regimes (The Economist, 
1998). In addition, NGOs and other non-business groups, which were specially concerned 
with environmental and labor issues, as well as with the issue of extraterritoriality and 
national sovereignty (the MAI could be seen as a supranational intrusion on domestic 
affairs), were among the fiercest opposers to the agreement. 
Some influential developing countries also looked with suspicion the negotiations on a MAI. 
Many prominent officials of countries such as India (Ganesan, 1997, 1998; Ramaiah, 
1997), Egypt (Shahin, 1997), Jamaica (Robinson, 1998), Pakistan, Malaysia, etc., 
expressed different concerns about the MAI preferring BITs, agreements within the ASEAN 
context and 'non-binding principles". 
Following Ganesan (1997) and Shahin (1997), the main criticisms of developing countries 
to the MAI , are the following: 
i) it seems improbable that new global disciplines to protect investment will encourage 
FDI flows, since most developing countries have now open investment regimes. At the 
same time, even if a country decides to liberalize its investment regime, nothing prevents 
it from imposing regulations later if the circumstances prescribe it so, while the MAI 
would forbid this event; 
ji) there is no empirical evidence for the view that if there was a multilateral treaty on FDI, 
the least developed countries would receive increased flows of FDI, since the primary 
determinants of FDI are the market and investment opportunities that the host country 
offer, the macroeconomic conditions, growth prospects and investment climate. 
Therefore, while a MAI may contribute to an improvement in the investment climate of a 
country, it will not be the dominant factor in directing FDI flows to developing countries; 
the MAI disciplines may constrain the ability of host countries to benefit from FDI 
according with their needs and development strategies. In particular, developing 
countries should lose their right to set PR on MNCs, according to their development 
objectives, and it would be more difficult for them to establish incentives geared to attract 
the specific types of FDI which they see as best suited for their development needs; 
while the efforts to finalize a code of conduct for MNCs were formally abandoned in 
1993, a MAI would increase their rights without establishing their obligations with respect 
to host countries; 
V) the definition of investment as adopted in the MAI was too broad, going beyond the 
traditional notion of FDI; 
the notion of NT was extended to the pre-establishment stages, impeding developing 
countries from restricting or excluding FDI of certain industries or activities; 
the MAI would not allow an exchange of concessions on FDI for advantages in other areas; 
lastly and more broadly, negotiations within the OECD meant that developing 
countries would be left with the option of only joining or refusing to sign the MAI, without 
being able to participate in the negotiations and expose their points of view1.6. 
MAI negotiations were formally abandoned in April 1998. Nonetheless, as said before, it 
is probable that fresh discussions may be held at the WTO. In this scenario, it seems 
relevant to analyze the possible impacts of an..MFI on developing countries. 
C) A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK ON INVESTMENTS: IMPACT ON 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Developed countries seem to be, overall, more interested in an MFI than developing 
countries, since they are trying mainly to protect the interest of their domestic firms when 
they embark in FDI operations. In turn, developing countries try to defend what they believe 
is the public interest and their right to an autonomous strategy for economic development, 
which, they think, may be in danger if excessive rights to foreign investors are granted. At 
first glance the dividing line is clear: developed countries -which are the source of FDI 
outflows- vs. developing FDI-recipient countries. However, this line is blurred since 
developed countries are not only the main source but also are the main recipients of FDI. 
Thus, many of them have interest in regulating the presence of foreign MNCs in their 
territories. In fact, different kind of restrictions and specific policies have been in place in 
several developed countries for many years. On the other hand, there are different 
perceptions among developed countries on the effectiveness of certain policy instruments 
regarding the attraction of investments towards specific sectors or activities, which are 
supposedly a source of spillovers. 
Among developing countries there is an array of different positions as well. First, there are 
several countries with significant outward investments, in Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and even China) as well as in Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico)17. Those countries would probably consider an agreement which grants some 
guarantees to the investments abroad by their indigenous firms with more enthusiasm, an 
enthusiasm reinforced if their inward FDI regimes were liberalized, since an MFI would not 
imply significant new obligations. In this regard, it is important to take into account that 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Hong Kong -all countries which nowadays have very liberal FDI 
regimes- have actively participated as observers of MAI negotiations and were interested in 
joining the agreement. In turn, there are many developing countries wishing to preserve their 
ability to discriminate against foreign investors and to impose requirements. 
A second dividing line runs across the different assumptions regarding the impact of FDI 
on development of host countries and on the possible contradiction of interests with MNCs. 
Some argue that any "investment-friendly" agreements is per se 'development friendly", 
and others that an MFI must contain explicit "development-friendly" provisions (see 
Drabek, 1998). 
In the first case MNCs are seen to contribute with resources such as capital and modern 
technology, which are generally scarce in developing countries. A MFI, by giving protection, 
stability and predictability to foreign investments, and by increasing the credibility of 
government commitments, should foster FDI to developing countries, thus contributing 
significantly to development. It could also provide developing countries with better market 
access opportunities and legal protection for their investments abroad. A MFI could be 
particularly of interest to small countries that do not boast a large home market and whose 
bargaining position is weak vis a vis larger foreign investors. By "pooling sovereignty" the 
MFI could help to prevent a downward competition for investment (OECD, 1998d). 
Moreover, a MFI would be favorable for developing countries if it contains disciplines on 
investment incentives, since poorer countries are at disadvantage at bidding wars, as they 
don't have "deep pockets" to set attractive incentive packages. 
Other arguments in favor of the idea that an MFI would be "development-friendly" per se include: 
regional or bilateral agreements marginalize non-signatory countries, while foreign 
investors prefer to do business with those countries in which they have a legal protection 
through an international agreement; 
an MFI would reduce transaction costs to MNCs resulting in greater supply of investible 
funds, or lower costs of FDI or both; 
since the agreement would likely include elements that can be seen as "prudential 
regulations" it would reduce the volatility of capital flows; 
an MFI would be an important instrument in order to avoid unilateral restrictions against 
each countries' exports; 
since an MFI would include a dispute settlement mechanism, it would give weaker and 
smaller countries a better chance to defend their rights (Drabek, 1998). 
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See Chudnovsky et al (1999), Dunning 
et al (1997), Mirza (2000), 
ksian developing countries are among 
the most reluctant to adopt disciplines 
on this issue. In a workshop recently 
held in that region to discuss FDI libe- 
ralization, financial crises and multilate- 
ral rules for investment it is stated that 
'there was wide agreement that any 
multilateral framework should not pre- 
vent host countries from introducing or 
maintaining incentives for FDI. These 
incentives will differ according to the 
level of development and to financial 
and macro-economic conditions' 
(OECD, 1998d) 
See also Hoekman & Saggi (1999) who 
also reject the need -and the feasibility- 
of an MFI, and argue that pursuing fur- 
ther trade fiberalization in goods and 
services on a non-discriminatory basis at 
a global level should be more fruitful for 
the purpose of investment liberalization. 
In turn, it is reported that Singapore is 
prone to veto the call for prohibition on 
investment subsidies at the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
(Moran, 1998). 
In the other camp, a "development-friendly" agreement should follow some guidelines 
(Ganesan, 1997; Robinson, 1998; Shahin, 1997): 
only direct investment must be included; 
being NT not altogether rejectable, at the establishment and pre-establishment stages it 
could inhibit the capacity to foster developmental objectives; 
developing countries should have certain flexibility in the matter of PR, particularly if 
they are linked to financial or fiscal incentives; 
the MFI should address the anti-competitive and restrictive business practices of the MNCs; 
y) a balance must be struck between the rights of foreign investors and their obligations. 
Regarding investment incentives, there is no clear-cut position among developing countries 
on if (and how) they should be included in an MFI. Some developing countries are in favor 
of maintaining their ability to grant incentives since these are seen as a tool to attract 
investments to countries or regions which lack some "fundamentals' -i.e. they are a 
compensation for investors- or to specific sectors which are of "strategic" interest for the 
host country. At the same time, incentives are often needed to compensate the PR which 
are imposed on MNCs18. Other developing countries are, instead, in favor of imposing 
international disciplines on this issue, taking specially into account that developed 
countries make an intensive use of incentives, deviating FDI flows which could go, in a 
"level-playing field", towards developing countries. 
Finally, it is important to take into account that two authoritative opinions have rejected the 
case for a global agreement on investments. On one hand, UNCTAD (1996) suggests that 
the current international arrangements concerning FDI regulation are working well and also 
allow for other countries to enter into existing agreements. UNCTAD also suggests that MNCs 
are flexible and experienced enough in operating diverse policy frameworks and they can 
adapt to regulatory differences among countries. Coherence among existing agreements 
could be ensured, for example, by negotiating a global common framework for BITs. In turn, 
Oman (1999) states that most competition to attract investments occurs within regions, not 
between them. Thus, any international co-operation among governments to help limit the 
potential damage caused by competition to attract FDI would probably be best envisaged at 
the regional level rather than the global level. Nonetheless, this being true for most of the 
investments projects, it must also be noticed that globalization has increased the mobility of 
investments and that some high-tech activities are mostly footloose (the case of the Intel 
investment in Costa Rica illustrates this point, since the original "short-list" included thirteen 
Asian and Latin American countries -Spar, 1998-)18. 
The failure of the Seattle Ministerial Session of the WTO, jointly with the abandonment of 
MAI negotiations, have delayed but not necessarily eliminated the possibility of a 
multilateral agreement on investments. In any case, investment will surely be one of the key 
issues in any multilateral negotiations in the future. 
IV. POLICY COMPETITION FOR FDI: THE REGIONAL DIMENSION 
Given that policy competition is mostly intra-regional, how existing regional agreements 
have addressed this issue needs to be discussed. 
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has non-binding principies on investments, 
which include the minimization of PR distorting trade and investment and a ban for 
member economies to relax health, safety and environmental regulations as incentives for 
FDI28. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) set a Scheme for the Harmonization of Fiscal 
Incentives to Industry in 1973, designed to limit the rivalry for the location of industrial 
activity, to assist in rationalizing the criteria applied in granting incentives and to reduce 
regional inequalities by creating preferential incentives for the least developed countries of 
the region. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this scheme has been undermined by 
different factors (Aranda & Sauvant, 1996). 
Within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) most new PR are banned and 
old PR must be gradually phased out. Linking a PR to subsidies is prohibited, but with 
some important exemptions. In effect, Member States can grant incentives conditional 
upon a requirement to "locate production, provide a service, train or employ workers, 
construct or expand facilities or carry out R&D" (Eden, 1996). In turn, given the broad 
scope for sub-national competition within Member States some initiatives to limit it have 
been taken. In Canada, a Code of Conduct on Incentives has been established, with 
complaints referred to the Internal Trade Secretariat for consultations, which has had only 
a modest impact on moderating competition (Thomas, 1998). In the U.S. there has been 
"no raiding" agreements in the Midwest and Northeast, accompanied by a rise of NGOs 
dedicated to inform about the perils of incentive races. Nonetheless, the U.S. "remains the 
outlier in terms of lack of self-discipline" (Moran, 1998, p. 166). 
In the case of MERCOSUR, the absence of any effective discipline on incentives -and more 
broadly the lack of coordination on FDI -related policies- has given room to serious 
controversies. In this scenario, there is a need to discipline the competition for investments, 
and to re-direct it towards socially desirable objectives -i.e., for example, fostering 
development in poorer regions- (see below). 
The EU remains the regional agreement with the most comprehensive treatment of 
incentives, through the provisions contained in the Treaty of Rome. Disciplines have been 
fairly successful, though they have not been exempt from failures. Since these disciplines 
might be used as a model for other regional and/or multilateral arrangements, it is relevant 
to describe them with some details. 
A) THE TREATY OF ROME 
Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome led to a general ban on subsidies ("State aids") in the 
common market. Within the EU legal framework, °aid" means any advantage conferred on 
a firm by the public authorities, without payment or against a payment which corresponds 
only to a minimal extent to the figure at which the advantage can be valued. State aids may 
consist for example of subsidies, interest-free loans, low-interest loans, interest rate 
subsidies, guarantees on preferential terms, relief from taxes or parafiscal charges, the 
supply of goods or services on preferential terms, or capital injections on terms which would 
not be acceptable to a private investor. Only selective aids are subject to control by the 
European Commission (EC), since they must favor certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods, and thus affect the balance between the recipient firm and its competitors. 
In this sense, state aid must be distinguished from general economic support measures, 
which apply across the board to all firms in all sectors of economic activity. A contribution 
confined strictly to offsetting an objective disadvantage imposed on the recipient is not 
caught by Article 92. Likewise State aids below ECU 100 000 over three years are not 
caught by Article 92. Even above that threshold, the effect of the aid on competition has to 
be shown. Aid to firms supplying goods or services in which there is no cross-border trade 
likewise falls outside the scope of Article 92 (EC, 1997). 
Notwithstanding the general ban on "competition-distorting" support, Article 92 states some 
circumstances in which aid is considered compatible with the common market. Support 
covered by exemptions provided by Article 92 are monitored and controlled by the EC 
through a vetting system. Member States are required to inform the EC of any plans to grant 
aid, and to obtain authorization before putting the plan into effect21. This system of control, 
is best understood as one of "bounded competition" for investments (Oman, 1999). 
The task of deciding whether or not an exception can be granted is primarily the responsibility 
of the competition policy directorate of the EC. The decisions of the EC are regularly published 
to favor transparency about the mechanisms of approval of state aids and to ensure that its 
discretion is exercised with the proper openness and that public authorities and businesses 
are clear about their legal position. Nonetheless, criticisms have been raised regarding the 
lack of transparency and slowness of the EC procedures (Aranda & Sauvant, 1996). 
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If a Member State fails to cornply with 
its obligation to notify and its obligation 
to await authorization, the Commission 
may initiate proceedings either at its 
own initiative or in response to com- 
plaints from competitors. 
There are other exemption clauses in 
Article 92. For example, state aids can 
be permissible if they intend to promote 
the execution of an important project 
for common European interest (it has 
been used, for example, to allow subsi- 
dies for the development of the Airbus 
commercial aircraft). Moreover, there 
are other forms of state albs within the 
EU, each one with its own regulations, 
and which have a sectoral (agriculture, 
fisheries, coal, railways, e,c.) or hori- 
zontal coverage (EMES, R&D, environ- 
ment, employment, etc.). 
Besides the state aids, the EU has 
implemented some :nstruments 
designed to foster the development of 
the less prosperous countries and 
regions within the Union. These instru- 
ments include the Cohesion Fund and 
some of the so-called EU s Structural 
Funds -the European Regional 
levelopment Fund (ERDF), the 
ropean Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the 
European Social Fund (ES9-. 
There are quantitative limits to regional 
aid. For backward or 'least favored° 
regions the aid cannot exceed 75% net 
grant equivalent of initial investment. 
For development regions it cannot 
exceed 30%, and depending on the 
category must often be lower. In fact, 
the quantitative ceilings vary from 
region to region, and the 75 and 30% 
limits apply only to regions where 
development or employment problems 
are more serious. A single investment 
can receive both regional aid and other 
regionally differentiated ami only provi- 
ded the sum of the regional aid and the 
regional component of the other aid do 
not exceed the above-mentioned cei- 
lings. In turn, there is no threshold on 
national spending on state aids. 
Pome incentive measures ¡are specially 
designed to influence international 
locational choice. This is the case of the 
capital grant available in Northern 
Countries must apply for authorization to apply aids intended "to promote the economic 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is 
serious underemployment" -these are called "least favored" or "backward" regions- (Article 
93, 30 a) and "to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas -termed as "development areas"-, where such aid does not adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest (Article 92, 3° c)22. These 
exemptions allow only aid towards initial investment. Aid towards continued operation, 
known as "operating aid", does not qualify for authorization, except in backward regions 23. 
To assess these incentives a Communication was issued in 1988 addressing the need to 
establish rates of award which reflect the severity of the regional problem; the need to 
develop a common method of assessing the value of regional aid; the need for 
transparency; and the need to restrict regional aid to those areas where it is really justified 
(Bechtler, 1996). 
Backward or "least favored" areas are located in regions which have an abnormally low 
standard of living (per capita GDP of 75% or less of the EU average) and serious 
underemployment. Regarding "development areas", a two-stage analysis has to be carried 
out. In the first place, to qualify for aid under point 3 c, per capita GDP/GVA of the region 
must be at least 15% below the respective Member State's average, or structural 
unemployment must be at least 10% above the Member State's average. That figure is then 
adjusted by reference to an EU average, in such a way that the better the position of the 
region under consideration compared with the EU average, the greater the disparity there 
has to be between it and the national average in order to justify the grant of aid. At a second 
stage results of the first phase are corrected, within limits, to take account of other relevant 
economic indicators such as the trend and structure of unemployment, the development 
of employment, net migration, geographic situation or population density24. 
Western European countries do not explicitly promote FDI over domestic projects yet in 
practice a huge part of incentives are granted to foreign investors; for example, roughly half 
the value of all regional development aids in Great Britain have gone to FDI between 1984 
and 1995. In turn, a significant part of inflows in the EU have enjoyed incentives. For 
example, nearly 80 per cent of all greenfield FDI in Ireland has received regional aids 
according to data for the late 1980s25. 
Nonetheless the data on average actual award rates show a decline in most EU countries 
over the last 15 years. It must also be noticed that actual award rates are markedly below 
the ceilings. Moreover, government expenditures on incentives have been declining in most 
countries, either as a response to community controls or because of national budget 
constraints (Oman, 1999). In fact, the EC has taken a number of steps in order to tighten its 
controls, including limits to the overall volume and cuts on certain types of aid either because 
of the sums involved and/or their special potential to distort competition. The reduction has 
been proportionately higher in the poorest regions (Aranda & Sauvant, 1996). 
Direct financial incentives are the most important form of incentive investment in the 
EU, and they are mostly in charge of national authorities. In turn, indirect financial 
contributions are mostly granted at local level. Local assistance, even if the amounts 
involved are in general substantially lower than those offered by the direct incentive 
programs, is viewed as having a key role in the later stages of inward investment 
promotion (Bechtler, 1996). Local assistance usually takes the form of labor market 
subsidies (including mainly training and employment assistance) and property 
concessions and preparation of potential investment sites. 
One of the consequences of these principles has been the tendency towards greater 
homogeneity in the forms of assistance offered across the EU. At present, in all the 
countries the main form of assistance is related to initial investment or job creation. Another 
key consequence is that the poorer regions are authorized to offer higher levels of 
assistance than the wealthier regions. This is reinforced since the EC can forbid regional 
aids that would relocate an investment from a less to a more prosperous region. 
The EC's ordering from most to least transparent incentives is: i) grants; ii) tax reductions; 
iii) soft loans or tax deferrals; iv) guarantees; v) equity injections. Capital grants in 
particular are visible and easy to understand for potential investors and they are flexible 
and reiatively easy to administer and monitor both by governments and the supervisory 
body. According to a recent evaluation, the EU has been succesful in having most aid 
given through grants and tax reductions in most Member States (Thomas, 1998). 
In balance, the EU approach to disciplining incentives appears to have worked reasonably 
well. It provides a regulatory framework which grants some measure of autonomy for 
governments that wish to offer incentives (at the national and sub-national level) but it also 
confers some autonomy for the supervisory body, and it establishes procedures for 
enforcement and sanctions, which are backed by provisions for judicial review. However, 
the aid programs have actually reinforced rather than reduced existing differences in 
locational 'attractiveness°, since countries authorized to offer the highest award rates tend 
to be those that most lack the resources to do so26. It has also been observed that the fall 
in aid in less developed countries has been proportionately greater than in more prosperous 
states and that several advanced areas of the EU offer regional spending that is competitive 
(on a per-capita assisted basis) with that of poorer European regions (Thomas, 1998). This 
has led some authors to suggest that it is by no means clear that regional incentive policies 
have been able to achieve their basic objective, i.e. to stimulate development in less 
developed regions, when considered at a European level; in fact, the evidence suggests that 
competition over incentives has favored the more prosperous countries (Oman, 1999). 
One reason maybe that the EC addresses its requests for information and its Decisions 
on State aids to national governments, although increasingly regional and local 
authorities deal directly with investors. Since national authorities have little motivation to 
force sub-national governments to respond to the EC inquiries and Decisions, there is 
scope for local and regional governments to evade scrutiny. Also the EC may ultimately 
lack the political independence and the administrative authority that it would need to 
impose its views vis a vis EU governments. The EC decisions on these issues used to 
generate controversies with Member States. These disputes have subsided in recent 
years because the EC has shifted away from "drawing maps" and towards defining the 
proportion of a country's population eligible for regional assistance. There is also a 
weakening of the EC ability to impose its views, especially on France and Germany. Both 
have been able to negotiate major increases in the population ceilings which the 
Commission intended to set, and then to designate the areas eligible for assistance 
largely on their own terms. These tensions have led to tighter aid guidelines to ensure 
both the reduction of regional disparities and genuine support for the less-favored 
regions. The reduction in aid intensities for large firms is of particular importance, 
seeking, among other things, to offset the potential for regional aid to induce firms to 
relocate27. Besides, the guidelines stipulate that the aided investments and jobs must 
remain in the region concerned for at least five years. An amendment to the method for 
choosing regions coming under Article 92 has also been introduced28. Regarding large 
projects, the new framework lays down rules aimed at reducing any competition- 
distorting effects by lowering the aid ceiling compared with the maximum ceiling of 
intensity authorized in the region concerned, and this on the basis of three criteria: the 
capital-labor ratio; the degree of competition in the relevant market; and the impact on 
regional development29. On the other hand, new rules on investment-linked employment 
aid have also been introduced to enable Member States to provide more support for 
labor-intensive investments. 
B) FDI-RELATED POLICIES IN MERCOSUR 
In 1991 the Treaty of Asunción was signed giving birth to the MERCOSUR, a Customs 
Union which was to be completed by 1995 among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
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Ireland, under which capital investment 
support of up to 30% of eligible expen- 
diture can be obtained for investment 
projects, but a discretionary award of 
up to a further 20% can be offered to 
desirable internationally-mobile pro- 
jects. The sectoral focus of many assis- 
tance programs sometimes favors 
clearly FDI. This is the case of the 
Internationally Traded Services 
Program in Ireland, focused on service 
sectors with strong international market 
potential, such as financial and health- 
care services, which in practice attracts 
mainly foreign investors since there are 
few domestic entrepreneurs in those 
sectors. The emphasis on the technolo- 
gy content of the projects may be also 
a de facto discrimination in favor of FDi 
in some countries. Incentives which 
favor larger size projects can in fact 
also discriminate in favor of FDI. 
For example, Portugal's per capita 
spending on regional aids is about one- 
tenth of Germany's. 
The rule on large investment projects is 
a step towards the objective of adopting 
a single approach to mejor awards 
under regional aid schemes regardless 
of the sector involved (EC, 1998). 
The method will henceforth consist of 
two stages: i) the fixing by the EC of a 
ceiling on the population covered by 
the exemptions in Article 92 at Union 
level and its distribution among 
Member States; ii) the notification by 
Member States of the methods and 
indicators they wish to use in choosing 
the eligible regions and of the list of 
regions they propose for exemption 
under Article 92. At the same time, the 
EC fixed the ceiling of coverage of 
regional aid at 42.7% of the population 
of the EU for the period 2000-2006, a 
four percentage points reduction on the 
current coverage. 
These three criteria are each translated 
into a coefficient the value of which 
varies with the project's characteristics. 
To obtain the theoretica ceiling of per- 
missible aid for a large-scale project, 
the maximum intensity authorized in 
the region concerned rnust be multi- 
plied by the three coefficients obtained, 
provided the product of these coeffi- 
cients is less than one. Most of the time 
this is likely to be the case, especially 
where capital-intensive projects are 
concerned. Here, the intensity of the 
aid authorized for large-scale projects 
will therefore be well below the allo- 
wable ceiling for the region in question 
(EC, 1998). 
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The sectors which were included in the 
exemption lists are: real state at frontier 
zones, air transport, naval industry, 
nuclear facilities, uranium, insurance 
and fishing (Argentina); mining, hydroe- 
lectric energy, health assistance, radio, 
TV and telecommunicat ons, rural real 
state, banking, insurance, construction, 
fluvial and coastal sailing (Brazil); real 
state at frontier zones, inedia; air, sea 
and terrestrial transport, electric energy, 
water services and telecommunications, 
mining, petroleum extraction, import and 
refining and mail service (Paraguay): 
electric energy, hydrocarbons, basic 
petrochemicals, nuclear energy, 'strate- 
gic minerals extraction, banking, rail- 
ways, telecommunications and media 
(Uruguay). Brazil also made reservations 
tegarding NT and MFN in relation with 
state purchases. Argentina and Brazil 
made reservations of the PR included in 
their respective automobile regimes. 
Uruguay. In spite of insufficient institutional building and the lack of several basic 
coordination and harmonization schemes among Member States, the MERCOSUR had a 
remarkable success in terms of the growth of intra-regional trade and the attraction of FDI. 
The participation of MERCOSUR member countries in world FDI inflows has increased from 
1.4% in 1984-89 to 4% in 1990-98. In fact, these flows have been mainly concentrated in 
Argentina -where FDI inflows reached more than U$S 40,000 millions between 1990 and 
1998- and in Brazil -almost U$S 70,000 millions in the same period-. 
At first glance, this would suggest that regional integration has become a key factor of attraction 
for FDI as was the case in the 1960s with the emergence of the European Economic Community 
and in the 1980s and early 1990s with the Europe 1992 project. An enlarged market would not 
only induce a displacement of exports with FDI but also lead to additional FDI to take advantage 
of economies of scale and specialization and generate growing intraregional trade. Nonetheless, 
there have been another locational advantages in place both in Argentina and Brazil: the 
recovery of macroeconomic stability, the high rate of growth of domestic market size (in 
Argentina), the adoption of structural reforms, etc. Among the latter, privatization became a 
powerful tool for attracting FDI in both countries. 
Moreover, while most restrictions to the operations of foreign firms have been eliminated in 
MERCOSUR member countries, the growing interest of national and local governments in 
attracting investment flows have led to the establishment of incentives mostly at regional or 
sectoral levels (see Chudnovsky & López, 2000 and Laplane et al, 2000, for recent assessments 
of investment incentives within MERCOSUR). In some cases like the automobile industry this 
situation has led to some disputes and fears of investment diversion. In this scenario, arguments 
have been raised in favor of disciplines on incentives within the MERCOSUR. 
The MERCOSUR legal framework for investment lies basically in two protocols signed in 1994: 
the Colonia Protocol for the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments (called the 
"intra-zone" protocol) and the Colonia Protocol on Promotion and Protection of Investments 
from non-Member States (termed the "extra-zone" Protocol). The "intra-zone" protocol 
contains, among other provisions, the guarantee of Member States to grant NT and MFN 
rights not only at the post-establishment, but also at the pre-establishment and establishment 
stages (transitory exemptions are accepted, though no calendar was fixed for their progressive 
removal30). Performance requirements such as export commitments, local purchases of 
certain goods and services, and the like, are forbidden. However, investment incentives are 
not mentioned. The "extra-zone" Protocol confers foreign investors NT and MFN rights only at 
the post-establishment stage. At the same time, there is a ban on positive discrimination in 
favor of investors from non-Member States. Despite a declaration of principles regarding the 
need to establish a basic framework to avoid the distortion of investment flows, nothing in this 
protocol prevents Member States from granting investment incentives. 
The core partners in MERCOSUR, Argentina and Brazil, are federal states. In the case of 
Brazil, sub-national governments have significant autonomy in fiscal matters, while in 
Argentina fiscal federalism is, in practice, substantially limited. No domestic discipline on 
incentives exists in Argentina.. In Brazil, the federal government has failed to apply existing 
legislation which authorizes it to impose limits (Motta Veiga & Iglesias, 1997; Motta Veiga, 
1999). In sum, there are few, if any, legal constraints for an investment race within the 
MERCOSUR, neither at regional nor at national levels. 
On one hand, since the adoption of Convertibility in 1991 Argentina adopted a sort of 
"rules-based" competition, based, among other things, on the strict legal protection for 
property rights, predictability and the adoption of a "market and investor-friendly" policies. 
However, incentives-based competition was .not absent. An automobile regime was 
established in 1991, including trade related investment incentives as well as trade-related 
PR for local producers. A regime for mining was adopted in 1993, including a 30-year 
guarantee of no tax increase for investors. The privatization program, in turn, had some 
specific features geared to attract foreign investors. FDI showed a strong response to these 
incentives, but was also attracted by the macroeconomic stability, the enlargement of the 
domestic market and MERCOSUR. 
On the other hand, in Brazil significant fiscal decentralization took place during the 1980's, 
which allowed sub-national governments to develop programs to stimulate new 
investments. These programs only became successful when macroeconomic adjustment 
created the conditions for a new cycle of productive investments and for the return of Brazil 
as a key host country for FDI. In this scenario a phase of intense policy competition 
between sub-national governments to attract new investments began to take placen. 
Real "bidding wars" among state governments have taken place, though most contracts are 
secret -lack of transparency being one of the most questioned aspects of this phenomenon. 
There is evidence also that policy competition has tended to extend to the fields of regulatory 
derogation's targeted at removing laws or norms which are considered too rigid by companies. 
Hypothetically, this could be the case of national environmental and labor standards 
unequally applied amongst regions and states. However, sub-national governments are by no 
means the only players in policy competition for investments. The Federal Govemment has 
also been active in this field, being the main example the automobile regime adopted] in 1995, 
whose explicit motivation was the need to compete with the regime that was in force in 
Argentina since 1991, which was seen to be diverting investments programmed for the 
MERCOSUR. The Federal Government has also avoided any kind of control of policy 
competition at the sub-national level and it made no effort to enforce existing legislation in that 
area (Motta Veiga, 1999). In fact, when at the beginning of 1999 the Rio Grande do Sul 
government decided to reduce the incentives promised to Ford and General Motors due to 
fiscal restrictions, the federal government granted Ford with incentives for a plant in Bahia and 
announced that fiscal incentives would be available for all firms wishing to produce in the 
backward zones of the North, North-East and Middle-East of Brazil. 
According to La plane et al (2000), while federal incentives have mainly paid attention to the 
impact of investments on the trade account of the payments' balance, sub-national 
incentives were mostly concerned with "demonstration effects" (to attract further 
investments) and with employment generation. Objectives such as fostering R&D activities 
or other "spillovers-generating" activities have been mostly absent both at national as well 
as at sub-national levels. 
Strong criticisms have been raised regarding the outcome of incentive-based competition 
in Brazil. According to Motta Veiga & Iglesias (1997), for example, the subnational dispute 
to attract automobile industry investments has lost or misallocated funds for the economy 
as a whole and has become a stimulus to future idle capacity. Although no clear evidence 
exists, it seems that assemblers and their main suppliers made their investment decisions 
independently of any state subsidies. However the authors also state that the Brazilian new 
context has induced sub-national governments to modernize and organize themselves 
more flexibly with a view to enhancing local competitiveness. In this sense, state 
governments are "learning not only how to negotiate incentives but to help investors identify 
investment opportunities, target potential investors, co-ordinate and professionalize their 
actions, and improve their own learning skills". They also argue that the states most 
successful in competition for investments are those where the requirements for "good 
government" seem to be met. 
Sub-national policy competition for investments had been relatively insignificant in 
Argentina during the early 1990s, though some provinces displayed "marketing" efforts 
to attract investors. This situation changed by 1996-1997, when the "fiscal war" among 
the Brazilian states began to raise concerns on the Argentinean side, even if Brazil did 
not operate against the regulations of MERCOSUR but moved into untapped areas 
(Campos, 1998). At that moment the Argentine federal government could only obtain 
minor commercial concessions in spite of its complaints, since the Brazilian government 
alleged that it had no power to cut the states capacity to offer incentives. 
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The incentive packages of Brazilian 
sub-national governments typically 
include state and municipal fiscal and 
financial incentives and subsidized 
dedicated infrastructure. Staie partici- 
pation in the capital of major ventures, 
via direct injections or by means of a 
development fund and subsidized 
training and qualification of labor force 
are also present in many packages. 
32. 
Currently the authors are undertaking a 
research project on the trade patterns of 
MNCs affiliates in MERCOSUR countries 
d on the role played by incentives to 
ettract FDI flows under the 'Mercosur 
Economic Research Network ' financed 
by the international Development 
Research Centre of Canada. 
Nonetheless, some Argentine provinces reacted more agressively. Buenos Aires, the most 
affluent Argentine province, announced a reduction in some provincial taxes for new 
investments, claiming that it was a response to Brazilian incentives (De la Guardia, 1997). 
In turn, even if the limited fiscal attributions of the Argentine provinces put relatively low 
ceilings to sub-national 'fiscal wars", there is a significant anecdotal evidence showing an 
increase in the use of investment incentives in the late nineties. This tendency was 
reinforced after the real's devaluation in february 1999. In that year, the governor of 
Córdoba, the second richest Argentine province, announced that he was ready to make the 
best bid for an investment which the German MNC Volkswagen had decided to install 
within MERCOSUR (see Chudnovsky & López, 2000, for a description of the incentives 
granted to Volkswagen). Later on, by the end of 1999 a widespread concern existed 
because a number of Argentine firms had decided to relocate their plants in Brazil due to 
the presence of significant incentives. This led many politicians, including provincial 
governors, to propose retaliation measures against Brazil. 
Regarding the perspectives of policy competition within MERCOSUR, there are three 
factors which could eventually lead to a decrease in its intensity. First, sooner or later 
budget constraints should lead governments to restrain the use of fiscal and financial 
incentives, specially if stricter fiscal disciplines are adopted within Argentina and Brazil both 
at national as well as specially at sub-national government levels. Second, a mandate was 
included in the new regional automobile regime recently signed by Argentina and Brazil 
regarding the need to undertake an analysis of the incidence of the different investment 
incentives which are in place in both countries. Third, a working group was recently 
established to analyze the investment incentives in place within MERCOSUR countries and 
evaluate feasible alternatives for harmonization. It can be expected that at least more 
transparency should be the result of these initiatives, which could eventually be the first 
step in order to design a framework to monitor and control policy competition for 
investments within MERCOSUR. This cautious optimism is reinforced since after serious 
controversies within the bloc in 1999, at present there is a more positive climate regarding 
the MERCOSUR perspectives. In this light, the decision to advance towards macroecomic 
convergence goals may also help to diminish the intensity of policy competition for 
investments within MERCOSUR. 
In turn, recent studies about the impact of FDI on Argentina and Brazil have suggested the 
existence of some issues, which deserve attention and call for more activist FDI-related 
policies (Chudnovsky & López, 1997, 1998, 2000; Laplane & Sarti, 1997; Laplane et al, 
2000). First, though in Argentina and Brazil exports by foreign firms have increased more 
than exports by domestic firms, the import coefficient of foreign firms also seems generally 
greater than their export coefficients. Besides, MNCs tend to have huge deficits in their 
trade relations with developed countries. The contribution of FDI to the growing 
merchandise trade deficit in both Argentina and Brazil, has thus became a critical issue. 
While this situation may change in the future, so far only those MNCs engaged in resource 
based investments are clearly net exporters32. 
Second, technological spillovers seem to be weak. MNCs do not devote significant resources 
to R&D activities, and have seldom created technological networks with suppliers, customers, 
competitors or research institutions. Third, in the 1990s MNCs affiliates appear to have 
destroyed more than created linkages with domestic suppliers, since trade liberalization 
allowed for a higher foreign content of local production, pari passu with the trend towards a 
greater reliance on "global suppliers" which is visible, for example, in the automobile industry. 
(see Motta Veiga, 1999 and Casaburi et al, 1999 for the negotiating implications). 
Last but not least, the implications of investment incentives for competition policy have 
yet to be assessed. In the EU, the competition policy directorate decides whether a 
proposed incentive may or may not be granted under agreed disciplines. In turn, the 
need of linking international investment and competition policy issues has been stressed 
specially by developing countries, which argue that any MFI should be complemented 
with an international agreement on international restrictive business practices (see 
Tavares, 1999, for arguments in favor of cross-border competition policy rules). 
MERCOSUR State Members have signed a Protocol for the Defense Competition in 1996 
but congressional approval is pending to be enforceable. This protocol provides 
mechanisms to curb business anti-competitive practices, calls for the convergence of 
domestic competition laws and provides an agenda for surveying public policies that 
distort competition conditions and affect trade among member countries. The Protocol 
calls upon member countries to undertake, within a two year period, preparations to set 
common standards and mechanisms aids susceptible to limit, restrict, falsify or distort 
competition and affect trade between the parties (lavares and lineo, 1998). The recent 
enactment of a new Defense of Competition Law (Nbr 25156) in Argentina which tends 
to alineate Argentinean competition policy regime with that in place in Brazil since 1994, 
may help harmonization in this area. 
Moreover, a technical committee on public policies that distort competitiveness has been 
operating since 1995, with the goal of identifying government measures affecting 
competition and decide whether they are compatible with the customs union. Few 
advances have been made by this committee until now, but the Argentine government is 
very interested in revitalizing its operation. Nonetheless, as is obvious the committee has 
not yet been very effective 
in disciplining competition Developed countries, which are interested in an 
for investments. However, MF1, are not interest in limiting policy competi- 
both the Protocol for the 
Defense Competition and tion, but in higher protection standards and 
the technical committee rights for their domestic firms investing abroad. 
could be the basis on 
which regional disciplines on investment incentives might be built. The task of 
introducing these disciplines should, thus, be closeiy related to the defense of 
competition and antitrust mechanisms, both at the national as well as at the regional 
level, following the experience of the European Union. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
Despite the arguments against activist FDI-related policies and investment incentives, in 
the real world most countries have both. These policies and instruments may be 
implemented at national and/or at sub/supra-national government levels, may be more or 
less overtly imposed, may be more or less discretionary, may imply few or significant 
public resources, etc., but the fact is that they exist, and that most countries are reluctant 
to give them up. Developed countries, which are interested in an MFI, are not interested 
in limiting policy competition, but in higher protection standards and rights for their 
domestic firms investing abroad. In fact, incentives-based competition for investments 
has been growing in recent years, and, contrarily to what one might presume, the 
developed countries are the main players. At the same time, many developed countries 
do have specific restrictions for FDI -which they were unlikely to abandon even with the 
MAI-, and target, through different provisions, preferred FDI operations (i.e. in order to 
promote backward regions, to develop high-tech sectors, to create jobs, etc.). 
In this scenario, without multilateral or regional disciplines, a country wishing to receive 
higher flows of FDI -or even to preserve the existing operations of MNCs- seems to be 
almost obliged to engage in some kind of incentives-based competition, specially when it 
comes to investments in high-tech sectors, or in the automobile industry, for example. 
Beyond this context other arguments may justify the employment of incentives and PR, 
and, in general, of FDI-related activist policies: 
FDI inflows may not always reach the socially desirable volume or composition; 
host countries may fail to reap from MNCs potential spillovers; 
there could be discrepancies between FDI and host country development objectives. 
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This is not to say that these kinds of policies are always correct -in the sense that their social 
benefits surpass their costs-, especially when they give place to "bidding wars". Incentives, 
in turn, may open the door to rent seeking and bribery, especially when they are of a 
discretionary nature. Furthermore, FDI-related activist and selective policies may foster 
domestic entrepreneurship, but may also contribute, for example, to technological 
backwardness of host countries. 
These objections must be taken seriously but the case in favor of incentives and FDI-related 
activist policies still holds. In any case, these objections call for a better design, monitoring 
and enforcement of those policies and for a cautious approach which should emphasize the 
need of reaping more externalities and of attracting specific types of FDI, more than to 
restrict the entry of MNCs or impose severe restrictions to their operations. More broadly, 
policy competition for FDI may have some positive externalities, especially when competition 
is rules-based. Countries have learned that investments are mostly attracted to countries with 
macroeconomic stability, high rates of economic growth, well-functioning legal systems, etc.. 
Besides, a key element to attract FDI is the magnitude and quality of what has been termed 
"created assets° (human resources, technological and communication infrastructure, etc.), 
which are more prone to attract "high-quality" investments. If governments are impelled to 
compete on the basis of the quality of their institutions and their human resources, their 
infrastructure, etc., significant externalities will arise. 
All this does not mean, however, that competition at large should be unleashed. In the case of 
regional agreements, the need of harmonization of FDI-related policies is evident. Even if full 
harmonization would surely prove impossible, any attempt in that direction may contribute to: 
avoiding the diversion of regional investment flows; 
limiting the amount of resources devoted to bidding wars; 
increasing the spillovers to be reaped from MNCs. 
At multilateral level without any brakes on competition, developing countries might lose the 
battle for investments. Developing countries should, thus, make efforts to increase 
transparency and limit locational incentives at world level, and should also try to constrain the 
use of other instruments which, in a disguised fashion, are employed to retain investments by 
developed countries -such as rules of origin or antidumping regulations. A "grand bargain' has 
thus been suggested (Moran, 1998). Although it could be demonstrated that not only 
developing countries' but also global welfare would be enhanced by creating a "slightly 
sloped" playing field in favor 
eloping countries Developing countries should, thus, make efforts of dev, the 
latter would perhaps be to increase transparency and limit locational 
better served if a "level" 
playing field were achieved. 
incentives at world level. 
In that scenario, developed countries would be forced to abandon or seriously restrict 
disguised protectionist practices and to limit the use of locational incentives. This if of course 
only a suggestion that needs to be justified and examined in detail. However, it highlights the 
fact that at the multilateral level the issue of incentives cannot be treated separately from the 
other dimensions involved in international trade and investments negotiations. 
In balance, since there are many unresolved questions regarding the effects of incentives 
and PR, the outcomes of policy competition for FDI and the conditions for success of FDI- 
related policies, a broad research agenda on these issues is left open. Nonetheless, beyond 
the need for further research on many key areas, in the light of the previous discussions on 
incentives and FDI-related policies three main policy suggestions arise: 
i) Within MERCOSUR, there is a need to establish investment-related disciplines at regional 
level, to limit the competition for investments, and to re-direct it towards socially desirable 
objectives. For example, by itseif, incentives-based and even rules-based competition will 
reinforce rather than reduce regional inequalities. In this sense, the adoption of rules similar 
to those in force in the EU should be of great help to limit "bidding wars" and to orient aids 
towards those areas with structural problems. Disciplines on investment incentives should 
be closely connected with those regarding competition policy. New regional initiatives 
should also take into account the flaws of the EU disciplines to consider the interests of the 
less developed regions within the Union. Schemes, similar to EU's structural funds could 
also help in fostering development in backward regions. At the same time there should be 
common rules if sectoral regimes are implemented, and existing sectorai policies should be 
unified, as it has occured in the case of the automobile industry. Last but not least, 
disclosure of information and transparency could help to limit incentives-based 
competition, as well as reducing the possibilities of bribery and corruption among 
government officials. 
A more activist approach towards FDI is needed to enhance the benefits which 
MERCOSUR countries reap from MNCs. Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, do not 
seem to meet the pre-requisite for the success of a selective approach towards FDI (as 
employed in some Asian countries). However, the evidence shows that many countries 
have implemented successful pro-active strategies including the targeting of priority sectors 
and the fostering of "spillovers-generating" activities, such as R&D, labor training, domestic 
linkages, etc. Domestic social or absorptive capability is a key factor to reap benefits from 
FDI. This includes different policy fields, such as education and training of human 
resources, institution-building, the creation or development of markets such as capital 
markets, fostering of domestic entrepreneurship, the enhancement of transport, 
communications and science and technology infrastructure, etc. Without significant 
improvements in these areas it will prove increasingly difficult not only to reap spillovers, 
but also to receive "high-quality" FDI inflows. 
Strengthening of the participation of MERCOSUR in regional and multilateral fora where 
investment issues are discussed. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) has a 
Working Group on Investment in operation. The Group is tackling, first, a stocktaking of the 
existing BITs and national regimes on FDI in Latin American countries and, second, 
recommendations on the different issues which could be addressed by an eventual 
agreement on investment in the FTAA. 
The issues at stake in multilateral negotiations on investments far exceed that of incentives 
and PR. For example, both Argentina and Brazil firms have made significant investments 
abroad, which could benefit from strengthening the guarantees brought about by a 
multilateral negotiation covering many different issues. Finally, even accepting the idea that 
a "grand bargain" may arise if an eventual MFI is negotiated at the VVTO, MERCOSUR 
countries should try, as far as possible, and as part of the group of developing countries, to 
preserve margins for implementing policies which may contribute to align FDI with host- 
country development objectives and which could foster increasing "high-quality" FDI inflows. 
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